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Thousands of the most impoverished New Yorkers have found shelter in the unlicensed, 
unregulated, for-profit housing market known as the three-quarter house industry. The houses—
scattered throughout the city— shelter individuals coming from a host of difficult circumstances: 
people who are formerly incarcerated, chronically homeless, and struggling with drug and 
alcohol dependency, unemployment, mental health conditions, and medical issues. Once there, 
residents are faced with rampant violations of their rights, dangerous physical housing 
conditions, and obstructions to recovery and reintegration. Through a historical lens, this paper 
argues that decades of neoliberal policies helped develop the three-quarter house industry as it 
exists today. These policies have had particularly harrowing effects on communities of color—a 
majority of whom make up the population of three-quarter house tenants. Along with taking a 
historical approach, the paper explores who depends on the three-quarter house industry for 
shelter, discusses the various routes that lead people there, and argues that much more research 
must be done to adequately diagnose the three-quarter house problem. Lastly, this paper 
considers how policy makers, advocates, and affected communities can work together to make 
systemic change. The whole society stands to gain both socially and economically from the 
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 For many years, New York City’s most vulnerable populations have struggled to find 
stable housing. In recent generations, circumstances have produced an even bleaker future for the 
poorest New Yorkers. Be it the loss of manufacturing industries and union jobs in the 1970s and 
1980s, a government sponsored shelter allowance for low-income households that has remained 
the same since 1988, policies that criminalize poverty and homelessness, or increased funding to 
prisons and slashes to drug education and support programs, the city’s most marginalized 
residents have become lucrative targets for exploitation, and they have the odds stacked against 
their stability and progress. Many of these very New Yorkers that are most affected by such 
circumstances have found shelter in a market of privately operated, unregulated, highly 
profitable residences know as three-quarter houses. These houses have expanded across the 
poorest neighborhoods of the city.  
 Individuals who reside in three-quarter houses deal with a host of difficult circumstances. 
Residents are often formerly incarcerated, chronically homeless, and struggling with drug and 
alcohol dependency, unemployment, mental health conditions, and medical issues. Behind closed 
doors, tenants face rampant violations of their rights, dangerous physical housing conditions, and 
impediments to recovery and reintegration.1 Aside from living on the street or in a homeless 
shelter, three-quarter houses are often the only other housing alternative to which these 
populations have access. Much like the tenants who live inside of them, the three-quarter house 
industry is still largely unnoticed. Policy makers, the press, and members of the community, have 
not paid adequate attention to three-quarter houses, which in the meantime, have quickly 




 In November 2014, Bill de Blasio was elected Mayor of New York City. Having 
campaigned on the concept of “A Tale of Two Cities,” de Blasio described a city unjustly 
divided between the wealthiest New Yorkers and the rest of the population. He spoke of a need 
for affordable housing, mandatory paid sick days for workers, an increased minimum wage, and 
a reform of broken policing. Most of the city’s progressive unions, community organizations, 
and politicians, celebrated the victory as an end to the Republican-led, Wall Street-friendly eras 
of Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg. And yet, while de Blasio’s progressive rhetoric inspired 
many across the city, others knew that it would take much more than that to truly prioritize the 
social needs of the most marginalized communities. 
 In New York City, social needs have been defined and redefined for decades. Dependent 
on the national agenda, the economy, and political and social circumstances, New Yorkers—with 
the help of powerful leaders—have defined and prioritized the social needs of the city time and 
again. In his 1937 article, “What is a City?,” sociologist Lewis Mumford described the purpose 
of city planning and how it affects human potential. He emphasized community values, enlarging 
the potential of human personality, and the need to support integration and participation. He 
wrote, “Social facts are primary, and the physical organization of a city, its industries and its 
markets, its lines of communication and traffic, must all be subservient to its social needs.”2 
Through this lens, this paper argues that maximizing our individual and collective potential is 
contingent on our meeting the social needs of three-quarter tenants and other marginalized 
communities. 
 By looking back at the 1970s through early 1990s, this paper will highlight the most 
important factors that enabled a shift away from what sociologist Alex Vitale calls urban 




refers to “the political philosophy of many postwar cities that combined entrepreneurial 
economic development strategies, personal rehabilitation and social work approaches to social 
problems, and a tolerance of social differences in the form of broad support for civil liberties.”3 
Vitale is one of many academics who argue that today, social needs have been redefined to be 
based on entrepreneurial freedoms. Geographer David Harvey defines this shifting of political-
economic practices as neoliberalism. He writes that neoliberalism has “created new systems of 
governance that integrate state and corporate interests, and through the application of money 
power, it has ensured that the disbursement of the surplus through the state apparatus favours 
corporate capital and the upper classes in shaping the urban process.”4 Harvey asserts that under 
this structure, neoliberalism has succeeded at redistributing, rather than generating, wealth and 
income.5 
 Using the framework of neoliberalism, this paper will highlight some of the most critical 
conditions that gave way to a shift in public consciousness, social and economic policies, and the 
re-prioritizing of social needs that further segregated and marginalized poor and minority 
communities in the city. Along with exploring these historical circumstances, the paper will 
examine one dire product of neoliberalism that involves some of the most vulnerable New 
Yorkers: the for-profit three-quarter house industry. While it is critical to understand the 
conditions which gave way to three-quarter houses, it is equally important to understand their 
current state and function, in the context of neoliberalism: our present reality. 
 The last goal of this paper is to examine how current, progressive politics—like that of 
Mayor de Blasio—are deeply rooted in a neoliberal foundation. Though government attempts to 
reform are not futile, reforming while advancing the neoliberal agenda will inevitably lead to a 




risk of becoming further marginalized in the long-term. The moralist, humanist perspective for 
justice should be sufficient to spur change.  But it is worth noting, in addition, that fighting 
against the further marginalization of poor and minority communities stands to benefit the whole 
society both socially and economically. This paper is as much a synthesis of information about 
the three-quarter houses as it is a call to action against further injustices against marginalized 
communities and to encourage the questioning of progressive politics.  
 
URBAN LIBERALISM TO NEOLIBERALISM 
 
“Everything is a money game in a three-quarter house. Once you get on public assistance and 
Medicaid, everything is money for them. They get the rent money from HRA6 and money from the 
drug program from Medicaid. They get a kickback. They try to burn your Medicaid. They’ll milk 
it away.” 
—50-year-old male tenant7 
 
 We are often reminded of our roots to liberalism in the United States: school textbooks 
remind us of the Protestant, immigrant work ethic that helped found the country, political 
candidates debate the extent to which government should involve itself in the lives of the 
citizenry, and individualism is celebrated in mainstream culture. Thomas Jefferson, Henry David 
Thoreau, and other prominent American philosophers advocated for a country based on freedoms 
from government restrictions on speech, religion, assembly, press, and the right to bear arms. 
Thoreau famously stated that “government is best which governs least.” Though our definition of 




traditions to expand political and economic agendas. Today, we have inherited an era that did not 
come by coincidence, but rather through a push for particular economic interests that led to 
drastic changes in the United States. The consequences of these changes have left the country 
with deep economic and social inequalities, letting few live in exorbitant wealth while most 
Americans struggle economically. 
 Under the liberalist guise of individualism and freedom, and with the ripe political and 
economic conditions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, powerful business elites pushed forth the 
doctrine of ‘neoliberalism’ and transformed it into the dominant economic theory of management 
around the world. Different from its predecessors—classical liberalism and embedded 
liberalism—David Harvey explains, “Neoliberalism is the first instance a theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”8 Under this doctrine, the 
responsibility of the state is to ensure that entrepreneurial freedoms can occur at whatever cost 
necessary and that they do not interrupt the markets once in place. The state must facilitate the 
structures that allow the markets to have absolute freedom to accumulate domestic and foreign 
capital: police, legal systems, military, and educational systems.9 However, long before the state 
could take on these roles, a host of failures in other areas of social service gave opportunists the 
space to devise and implement a plan for transition. 
 The Great Depression of the 1930s gave rise to a host of extensive changes in the United 
States. American journalist and author, Robert A. Caro, describes the dire situation that New 
York in particular, faced: “More than 10,000 of New York’s 29,000 manufacturing firms had 




estimated 1,600,000 New Yorkers were receiving some form of public relief.”10 Amidst such 
pressing conditions, major social unrest led to significant progress in “race relations and party 
alignment.”11 The New Deal reforms that resulted from government intervention helped provide 
what sociologist, Francis Fox Piven calls the “skeletal framework of an American welfare 
state…including union rights and wages and hours regulation, old age pensions, unemployment 
insurance, social assistance to the disabled and some of the very poor, housing assistance, and 
federal funding for public works.”12 These government-sponsored interventions helped reduce 
inequality and social disorder, thus placating the wider public and allowing business interests to 
flourish again. More than ever before, the New Deal era saw widespread support for an 
expansive state. 
 Around the globe, similar changes were taking place. As the Second World War came to 
an end, the U.S. saw major economic progress thanks to war production and the resulting profits. 
The U.S.’ foreign allies also turned towards an “acceptance that the state should focus on full 
employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its citizens, and that state power should be 
freely deployed, alongside of or, if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market 
processes to achieve these ends,” Harvey explains.13 Fiscal policies strived to reach a “class 
compromise” between labor and capital, and states provided new systems of welfare. As profits 
remained high and economies prospered, opposition to such policies were hardly heard.  
 Decades of change further supported civil rights reforms for individual and minority 
group rights in the United States. What resulted, Piven describes, was: 
 
 A new rush of reform, granting new political rights to African Americans, rights of  
 access for women in the workplace, stronger environmental and workplace   
 regulations, and new social welfare programs, including the first public health   




 programs, and the substantial liberalization of the cash assistance program for   
 poor women and children known as “welfare.”14  
 
 New Deal programs and Civil Rights reforms undoubtedly helped the middle class grow 
stronger. However, as history would later show, reforms failed to adequately confront the root 
causes of inequality. Experts huddled together to create social policies that supported civil 
liberties and reduced poverty.  Yet the same experts also focused on advancing economic 
freedoms. As Vitale explains, urban liberals used “individualized therapeutic responses to 
address [problems] while actively pursuing structural market interventions on behalf of elite 
interests, at a much greater cost.”15 This conflict between providing social services for people 
and also prioritizing entrepreneurial freedom would inevitably give birth to challenges in the 
U.S. as a new fiscal crisis emerged. 
 New York City served as the testing grounds for the neoliberal model in the 1970s. The 
height of the financial crisis of 1975 provided a unique opportunity to restore class power to 
business elites.16 As the recession ballooned, President Gerald R. Ford’s administration refused 
to provide support to the city in the form of a government bail-out, and instead, it required the 
city to “turn over fiscal management to a group of business leaders acting to secure the stability 
of the city’s debt on behalf of bondholders.”17 Their analysis of economic failures blamed too 
many social services for the poor and a lack of support to business interests. In response, Ford’s 
Secretary of Treasury William Simon said that the terms of any bailout were to be “so punitive, 
the overall experience so painful, that no city, no political subdivision would ever be tempted to 
go down the same road.”18 Austerity measures were initiated, social services drastically reduced, 
and the gains of the New Deal and post-war period, were drastically diluted or undone. The once 




entrepreneurial freedoms and diminish local government.19 The neoliberal agenda progressed in 
New York and the model of change helped pave the way for the rest of the country and world.20  
 As the United States increasingly moved to prioritize international economic interests, 
local communities saw the immediate consequences. Vitale cites, “Nationally, more than 38 
million jobs were lost in the 1970s in manufacturing and related employment.”21  To make up for 
such dramatic job loss, tax incentives and fewer regulations were substituted to attract new 
business to cities. Cities moved from prioritizing local economies to prioritizing the movement 
of capital. These new, “entrepreneurial cities,” as Vitale calls them, became “growth machines” 
in order to compete effectively with other cities worldwide. Education, health care, housing, and 
employee securities, moved from being provided by the state, to the capitalist market and then 
privatized. Freedom of enterprise and a market-based decision-making model became the 
template that still prevails today. The model continues to evolve as capital and information have 
become more dynamic, creative, and widespread. While global cities experienced tremendous 
growth and accumulations of wealth during these decades of change, the majority of people 
experienced major losses over time.22 
 One cannot understate the role that race relations played during this period of social and 
economic transition. As profit margins began shrinking in the United States in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, crime rates were rising in urban centers and powerful race riots erupted around the 
country. Law professor and civil rights activist Michelle Alexander argues that similarly, during 
this time,  
 
 Two schools of thought were offered to the general public regarding race,    
 poverty, and the social order. Conservatives argued that poverty was caused not by  





  …Liberals, by contrast, insisted that social reforms such as the War on   
 Poverty and civil rights legislation would get at the “root causes” of criminal   
 behavior and stressed the social conditions that predictably generate crime.23  
 
The winning image that appeared in the media and political discourse depicted black and brown 
bodies surrounded by street crime and drug use. With radicalized imagery in conjunction with 
liberalist rhetoric, conservatives proved to hold an advantage as they moved to change policy in 
the United States. By depicting black and brown people as a threat to stability, as deviants, and 
as undeserving welfare recipients, proponents of neoliberalism gained a seemingly indestructible 
piece of foundation to build from. In the subsequent decades, race would continue to play a 
central role in the creation of social and economic policies.  
 The 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s saw a rapid dismantling of the progress that had been made 
by minority groups, the working class, and the environment. All of this change, of course, 
occurred through democratic means. David Harvey explains: 
 
 Appeals to traditions and cultural values bulked large in all of this. An open project  
 around the restoration of economic power to a small elite would probably not gain much  
 popular support. But a programmatic attempt to advance the cause of individual freedoms 
 could appeal to a mass base and so disguise the drive to restore class power24…ould a 
 movements failed to recognize or confront, let alone transcend, the inherent tension  
 between the quest for individual freedoms and social justice.25 
 
Americans’ deep-seeded cultural commitment to liberalism proved another invaluable tool for 
the restoration of class power. As a culture, we reconceptualized liberalism to become more 
individualistic, protective, exclusive, and to be driven by economic forces. Meanwhile, 
government moved from being more expansive, to more restrictive in its social service policies. 
This move was no better illustrated than under President Ronald Reagan’s Administration. 




spending.26 The cuts, he argued, were justified by a need to reduce the federal deficit and by a 
“fundamental conviction about the proper relationship between federal, state, and local 
governments.”27 Within four years, New York City alone saw cuts to roughly $500 million in 
federal aid.28 
 While Reagan helped make changes on the federal level, others advanced and 
strengthened the neoliberal agenda locally. Almost a decade after Reagan initially took office, 
Ruby Giuliani was elected Mayor of New York City. Under his administration, the city saw 
harrowing changes take place. Alex Vitale writes that Giuliani “reformulated the homeless 
problem as a disorder problem by framing the issue in terms of “quality of life,” which allowed 
him to treat homelessness as a criminal justice issue and not a social services one.”29 By arguing 
that New Yorkers’ quality of life was under attack, he succeeded at expanding the role of the 
police department and criminalizing those who were seen as the perpetrators: poor and socially 
marginalized people. Panhandlers, squeegee cleaners, public drunkenness, street prostitution, 
graffiti, and sleeping in public spaces, were amongst the many things that became targets in the 
restoration of “order” in New York City.30 And while some were critical of such policies, even 
“middle-class community activists—many with roots in the social movements of the 1960s and 
1970s—mobilized to defend their neighborhoods from disorder.”31 What is left today is a lasting 
homeless class in New York City, and in cities around the country that have approached 





THE RISE OF THREE-QUARTER HOUSING 
 
“We went about a month with no electricity on the second floor, but then we got like a 50-foot 
industrial cord running from the first floor to the second floor so that I could have lights and 
heat and stuff in my room ‘cause we had power strips. Yeah, three of those. I worried because 
you got five different rooms up there with electrical heaters in them. But they called an 
electrician and he rewired the building. Everything’s on one circuit now. There’s two circuit 
boxes, but the electrician cut an extension cord and ran the wire from one box to the other. 
That’s how we got lights in the whole house. I watched him do that, and I just said, “Lord please 
save us.” It’s dangerous, a real bad situation.” 
—55-year-old male tenant32 
 
 There are no official statistics on the number of three-quarter houses in New York City. 
Government agencies and advocates believe there are hundreds of houses scattered around the 
lowest income neighborhoods, serving thousands of people transitioning in and out of the shelter 
system, prisons and jails, hospitals, and other health care facilities.33 This prevalence is not 
coincidental; rather, it took decades to radically shift policies, to change societal perceptions, to 
further segregate individuals desperately in need of shelter, and to construct the three-quarter 
house industry as it exists today. Thus, to begin understanding the present reality, we must 
examine the decades of change that helped built its foundation.  
 When Fiorello Henry La Guardia became mayor of New York City in 1935, he inherited 
a distressed city, plagued by economic, housing, and health crises spawn by government-led 




jobs, evictions were rampant, and many were left to survive by going to soup kitchens or by 
searching for scraps of food on the street. As a reformer during the New Deal era, La Guardia 
began his three-term run by supporting Franklin D. Roosevelt’s public services agenda and 
furthering it on a local level. He famously transformed New York City into a model post-
Depression city, by weeding out corruption and adopting policies and infrastructure to combat 
poverty.  
 Among many accomplishments, La Guardia is remembered for his work to make public 
housing accessible to low-income New Yorkers. Until then, over two million of New York’s 
lowest income residents had sought refuge in tenements around the city.34 These buildings—
often made-up of small rooms and lacking sufficient air, light, & indoor plumbing—packed 
dozens of people into rooms. People living in tenements lived in constant risk of fires and 
widespread disease. While residents of tenements lived in squalor, tenement owners often 
enjoyed living in wealth. Housing reformers under La Guardia spoke out: “If you read through 
the list of wealthy owners of tenements, you will think you are reading the social register.”35 
Such major inequalities had become less acceptable and New Yorkers were ushering in new 
ideas to confront the housing crisis.  
 Picking up where others before him had left off, in 1934, La Guardia began undertaking 
the mammoth task of confronting tenements in New York City and creating a more sustainable 
housing model. He believed that private enterprise and housing should be separated, and that 
housing—like transportation or sanitation—should be provided by the government. Housing, 
according to La Guardia, was deeply intertwined with public health. Robert Caro explains, “The 
Mayor possessed an intense private interest in public housing. Fiorello La Guardia believed it 




given his beloved first wife tuberculosis that had killed her and their baby…” Further, he vowed 
to friends and family that he would finally “give poor people in the city a decent, healthy place to 
live.”36  
 The slums—the neighborhoods where many tenements were found—had been observed 
to have tuberculosis rates that were twice as high as the citywide average.37 If the government 
were to control public health, it had to control housing as well. In 1936—at the age of 54—La 
Guardia told the public, “By the time you reach my age, you will find housing accepted as just as 
much a function of government as water supply and sewage are now. That is because it plays 
such an important part in public health, which is one of the basic responsibilities of city 
government.”38 For the next 12 years in office, La Guardia’s Administration worked to create a 
new public housing model in New York City. The New York City Housing Authority 
(NYCHA)—the result of his efforts—would serve as a model for other cities to follow.  
 Public housing would not disappear in New York City, but it would move beyond La 
Guardia’s vision for housing reform and social work, to a business-oriented quantity-versus-
quality model.39 In the process, “slum clearance” would destroy communities and displace 
thousands of people. Author Samuel Zipp asserts: “[Housing] projects displaced more and more 
people, swelled public housing lists, taxed already impoverished tenement neighborhoods, and 
replaced an older world of horizontal affiliations and intimate, cross-class connections with new 
modern landscapes for a white-collar, cosmopolitan city.”40 Urban renewal policies replaced 
previous attempts to connect housing reform to public health, and ultimately further 
marginalized and segregated communities. 
 As the New Deal era ended and the post-war period progressed, business interests 




housing presented it as a threat to American values and freedoms. As Rodney Lockwood—
president of the National Association of Home Builders—put it, public housing was a danger to 
“free American institutions and a free economy based on individual initiative and 
responsibility…[public housing threatened] our traditional social and political concepts which 
are founded upon the family unit sheltered in its own dwelling.”41 Once again, uniting around 
and reforming the traditions of liberalism, real estate interests and politicians banded together to 
attack big government, defend private interests, and extend neoliberalism’s reach into the 
housing market. Attacks on public housing at the federal and local level eventually led to 
defunding and shrinking support. The belief that La Guardia so strongly hoped society would 
adopt—safe housing as a support to public health—would be abandoned. Instead, housing would 
become another free market commodity. The national discussion around public housing would 
help to marginalize communities living in public housing projects in New York City and 
throughout the country.  
 Adding to the growing housing crisis in New York City, in the 1950s, the city began 
limiting the use of single-room occupancy (SRO) housing units. In New York City, the 
appropriately-named SROs have historically provided basic shelter to single adults. As housing 
advocates Brian Sullivan and Jonathan Burke describe, “Most SRO tenants live in single rooms 
and share bathroom facilities located in the common areas of the building; lack of access to 
kitchen facilities of any sort is common.”42 But beyond the basic characteristics, SROs have 
varied significantly in their uses and their inhabitants over time. Sullivan and Burke explain 
further, “SRO housing is as old as New York City itself…From the early 1900s, SROs 





 The number of SRO units grew drastically during the years of the Great Depression and 
the WWII era. In the 1930s and 1940s, landlords began converting large SROs into smaller units 
to rent to the poor, to workers seeking jobs in the city’s factories, to soldiers returning home, and 
migrants from the South and from Puerto Rico.44 By the mid-twentieth century, there were 
approximately 200,000 SRO units in New York City. As SRO housing became more visible and 
provided housing to New York’s neediest, it also drew attention from housing advocates, 
housing reformers, and social critics. Advocates called for a scaling back of SROs and their 
replacement with more humane housing while social critics and housing reformers called for 
modernization.45 
 Beginning in the 1950s, the city initiated policies that would drastically reduce the 
number of SRO units available in New York City, including banning construction of new SRO 
units.46 Along with banning new construction, Sullivan and Burke write, “[the city] mandated the 
reconversion of many of the new SRO units,47 altered building and zoning codes to discourage 
SRO occupancy,48 and, from the mid-1970s until the 1980s, provided tax incentives to encourage 
the conversion of all SRO units to (higher rent) apartments.”49 Following neoliberal trends that 
were taking hold around the world, the tax program was especially disastrous for SROs as 
landlords responded to profit-making opportunities in the market. Forcing SRO tenants out, 
landlords moved to convert buildings into high rent luxury housing. One study by the New York 
State Assembly found that between 1976 and 1981, the city’s tax incentive program caused the 
elimination of nearly two-thirds of remaining SRO units.50 By 1993, the L.A. Times noted that 
there were approximately 46,744 SRO units left in New York City.51 By 2002, the U.S. Census 




 What resulted from the destruction of SRO housing stock in New York City was not 
predicted or prepared for. Attempts to eliminate deteriorating housing stock, to hide the poor, 
and to modernize New York, left hundreds of thousands of people homeless. In 1980, studies 
showed that large numbers of men that lived in homeless shelters had previously lived in 
SROs.53 As city officials began dealing with the leftovers of the anti-SRO movement, the city 
passed policies and laws to defend the little SRO housing stock that was left.  
 While housing options for single adults dwindled in New York City, other major changes 
were taking place at the federal level that would contribute to the national housing crisis. Under 
President Ronald Reagan, the nation saw a decade of drastic cuts to federal spending. Among the 
greatest cuts were for low-income housing subsidies. According to urban policy analyst Peter 
Dreier, Reagan cut the budget for public housing and section 8 housing subsidies in half during 
his first year in office.54 This move, along with cuts to social service programs and a stagnant 
minimum wage, contributed to a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Between 1979 and 
1988, the number of people living beneath the federal poverty line rose from 26.1 million to 32.7 
million.55 
 As the number of people living in poverty increased, so did homelessness. In just three 
years, the number of homeless people in the New York City shelter system rose from 7,500 in 
1982 to 21,000 in 1985.56 Government officials blamed Reagan’s policies: Cesar A. Perales—the 
New York State Commissioner of Social Services in 1984—decried, “Unless we have a national 
low-income housing policy, we’re going to see more and more poor families unable to find 
accommodations. The public housing program came to halt with the election of Ronald 
Reagan…New York City is the first of older cities that has come to grips with what is almost an 




1984 interview on the television network ABC, Reagan proclaimed, “What we have found in this 
country, and we're more aware of it now, is one problem that we've had, even in the best of 
times, and that is the people who are sleeping on the grates, the homeless who are homeless, you 
might say, by choice.”58  
 As the Reagan-era came to an end in the late 1980s, the housing crisis was on the minds 
of New Yorkers. With record breaking levels of homelessness, people’s perception of disorder 
and threats to quality of life had increased. In 1987, The New York Times reported that New 
Yorkers thought crime to be the number one problem in the city, outweighing education, 
housing, or transportation.59 When the city did not see more immediate relief under a new federal 
administration and local government, they sought change in the following mayoral election. 
Defeating incumbent David Dinkins, Rudy Giuliani was elected Mayor of New York City in 
1994. Whereas Dinkins had focused on framing the homelessness problem as one pertaining to 
social services, Giuliani strived to reshape the discussion by appealing to traditional liberalist 
values: individualism and freedom. Giuliani—a former federal prosecutor—won on promises of 
fighting crime and restoring order to New York City. 
 As soon as he entered office, Giuliani initiated the creation of “independent living 
plans”: a proposal limiting the time that people could stay in shelters to ninety days, requiring 
people to agree to a treatment regiment, and requiring people to pay a part of the cost for their 
shelter.60 At the same time, Vitale notes, “The mayor began to reduce support to housing and 
treatment programs. Giuliani’s most serious move was the scaling back of the city’s subsidy 
program to house homeless families.”61 This “tough love” approach to social services would 
leave people without the important services they needed, and would further jeopardize their 




 While Giuliani scaled back access to social services, he also made unprecedented 
changes to policing and enforcement. In appointing Chief William Bratton to Police 
Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), Giuliani authorized a new 
series of “crime-fighting” strategies for the NYPD. One such strategy, called “Reclaiming the 
Public Spaces of New York,” aimed to use “broken windows” theory to “[restore] order through 
the aggressive enforcement of minor crimes such as prostitution, graffiti, loud music, public 
drinking,62 and “the specific crime and quality-of-life problems facing each 
community”63…which included new laws against aggressive panhandling and panhandling near 
ATM machines, regulations against sitting on the sidewalk, and rules forbidding the blocking of 
subway platforms.”64  
 These aggressive enforcement measures were not intended to solve homelessness in New 
York City. Instead, they were intended to limit the visibility of homelessness and create a new 
perception of quality of life for upper and middle class New Yorkers. Giuliani’s practice focused 
on confronting deep social problems as a crisis of social tolerance amongst some groups, rather 
than a failing economic system. This harsh strategy fell directly in line with the national agenda 
to promote neoliberal economic interests. 
 Cities and towns across the nation were developing similar policing strategies. By the 
1990s, former President Bill Clinton had readily adopted Reagan’s drug war. The War on Drugs 
had garnered enormous support nationwide and the private prison industry was booming. Its 
campaign had succeeded at saturating the media with images of black and brown “crack 
whores,” “crack dealers,” and “crack babies.”65 Advertisements no longer needed to reference 
race directly, as the face of drugs, crime, and deviance were embodied by people of color in the 




disorder, and helped support efforts by local police departments to adopt crime-fighting 
strategies like those adopted under Mayor Giuliani. The destruction that these strategies would 
have on the African American community would be astronomical.  
 As societal perceptions changed to focus on concerns of crime, an era of mass 
incarceration began. Author of The New Jim Crow, Michele Alexander, uses the term mass 
incarceration to refer to “the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control those 
labeled criminals both in and out of prison.”66 Hence, as more and more people were 
incarcerated, more and more people would then be disenfranchised and legally discriminated 
against when they were subsequently released. “In 1972,” Alexander writes, “fewer than 350,000 
people were being held in prisons and jails nationwide, compared with more than 2 million 
people today.”67 Most of the crimes committed were drug convictions and other low-level 
offenses.68 Further illustrating the devastating impact such policies have had on the African 
American community, in 2002, Dr. Paul Smith of the Chicago Urban League reported, “Blacks 
are 12.3 percent of the U.S. population, but they compromise roughly half of the roughly 2 
million Americans currently behind bars.”69 Further, he cites that nearly one in three black men 
in the United States possesses a felony record.  
 Mass incarceration has had devastating effects on individuals and their families across 
the nation. Alexander writes, “Like Jim Crow, mass incarceration authorizes discrimination 
against them in voting, employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury service.”70 
Housing discrimination is no better illustrated than in the policies that have been established to 
keep formerly incarcerated individuals out of public housing. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
gave public housing authorities the power to evict any tenant who allowed drug-related criminal 




Clinton also made it easier for federally assisted public housing projects to exclude anyone with 
a criminal history—an extraordinarily harsh step in the midst of a drug war aimed at racial and 
ethnic minorities.”72 He publicly encouraged public housing authorities to develop their own 
criteria for exclusion and show no leniency for tenants or guests who had engaged in criminal 
activity of any kind—no matter how minor the offense. 
 President Clinton’s approach—known as the “One Strike and You’re Out” legislation—
continues to be enacted today. NYCHA’s permanent exclusion policy stipulates that even an 
arrest that ends in no conviction, can be grounds enough to permanently exclude a family 
member or guest of a tenant. The law contains no requirement to inform the legal tenant of the 
drug usage or criminal activity for this to take place. In order for tenants to stay in their home, 
they must agree to the exclusion of “non-desirable” tenants or guests from all NYCHA premises, 
permanently. Between 2007 and 2014, NYCHA has permanently excluded 4,698 individuals 
from public housing.73 Housing and reentry advocates denounce NYCHA’s policy, citing 
destruction to families and support systems and increased homelessness among the results.  
 Looking back, Mayor La Guardia fought hard to make others believe that housing was a 
universal right for all, and that providing it related to the good of the broader community. While 
he made great strides and created permanent public housing that still exists today, his belief that 
housing was important for public health failed to prevail as he had predicted. The need for truly 
affordable housing in New York City continues to outweigh what is available to individuals who 
live in the city. Many of neediest New Yorkers have insurmountable obstacles blocking them 
from having access to the little housing stock that is available. Be it the little commitment that 
has been made to provide affordable housing in the last decades, the giveaways to developers for 




that an illicit housing market has developed to provide housing to New York’s most vulnerable 
individuals. If individuals cannot return home to their families, if they are barred from public 
housing, if they do not qualify for housing subsidies, and if they lack the same opportunities to 
find employment that can pay for legitimate housing, where else can they turn to but to the 
shelter system or some other illegitimate housing industry? Mayor La Guardia’s legacy lives on 
in New York City today, as housing advocates continue to fight for housing options for low 
income communities, with the belief that housing is an essential component to the health of the 
society. 
 
INSIDE THE THREE-QUARTER HOUSE 
 
“I want to first make a statement that three-quarter houses are a needed housing situation, and 
you can get people from any walk of life living in them. I ended up there not because I didn't 
want to work but because I was living with my grandmother and she died and I couldn’t afford 
the house anymore. We’re still human beings, and money is being paid for rent. We deserve a 
decent place to live.” 
—55-year-old male tenant of a three-quarter house74  
 
 Many people have never heard of the three-quarter house industry in New York City. 
That may be because three-quarter houses are largely invisible to most people. As one tenant 
puts it, “It’s really hidden into the community ‘cause that’s the way they like it. They want to 
keep it that way. Like, the community doesn’t really want us there.”75 Buildings are privately 




building on a given block, often being made up of one- and two-family homes or larger 
apartment buildings.76  
 Inside they are used by a population who deals with a host of difficult circumstances and 
are unable to rely on the few other housing options that exist for low-income New Yorkers. In a 
city that continues to become more expensive, this invisible housing stock has become a vital 
housing option for many and it is estimated that upwards of 10,000 New Yorkers rely on them at 
any given time for ultra low-cost housing.77  Though a passerby may not see the realities from 
the outside, just past the front door, tenants are squeezed into 4-, 6-, even 16-person rooms in 
some cases.78 While no systematic research has been conducted to count or document the 
number of three-quarter houses that exist in New York, the city estimates that there may be up to 
600.79 Because houses open, close, change their names, and move to other locations, advocates 
cite the difficulty in tracking houses and properly diagnosing how large the problem is.  
 In 2013, the Prisoner Reentry Institute (PRI) at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 
City University of New York, conducted nearly a year of research that included focus groups and 
in-depth interviews with 43 current and recent tenants of three-quarter houses in New York City. 
The goal of the study was to reach a deeper understanding of the three-quarter house industry 
and the experiences of tenants, as very little concrete information exists about the underground 
industry. The findings raised questions about the government’s role in the three-quarter house 
industry, the seemingly invincible house operators, and the futures of the tenants that reside 
there.  
 Three-quarter houses provide a crucial source of housing to many New Yorkers. 
A vast majority of tenants are black or Latino, many of whom are facing major life crises or 




chronically homeless, and are struggling with substance use disorders, unemployment, mental 
health conditions and medical issues.80 Most tenants subsist on public assistance benefits from 
the New York City Human Resource Administration (HRA). Though no data on the racial or 
ethnic composition of three-quarter house tenants exists, one can infer that a majority are black 
or Latino based on recipient data of public assistance benefits. In 2011, 16.4 percent of all 
households in New York City received public assistance. Of that group, 81.4 percent were of 
Puerto Rican, black, or non-Puerto Rican Hispanic households.81 The “shelter allowance” which 
has not been raised by the state since 1988, promises a maximum of $215 per month for single 
adults.82 Unable to access the regular housing market with so little income, tenants find shelter in 
the three-quarter house industry instead.  
 Much of the information that exists about the inhabitants of three-quarter houses is based 
on data about New York State prisons, New York City jails, and the city’s homeless shelters. As 
noted in the PRI report, “An estimated 25,000 people are released from New York State prisons 
each year, and of these, nearly half return to New York City.”83 In addition to the 25,000 people 
that are released from New York State prisons, within the parameters of the city, jails hold nearly 
another 12,000 individuals.84 People released from prison and jail that live in New York City are 
often cycled into the city’s homeless shelter system. In 2010, research showed that “discharge 
from the criminal justice system is now a primary institutional precursor to shelter use.”85 As 
individuals return to New York City, many are barred from public housing, from moving in with 
family members, and few have enough economic resources to find their own housing. 
 The findings of the 2013 PRI report also suggest that many tenants of three-quarter 
houses experience high rates of mental health conditions and substance use disorders. , in 2007 




chemical dependency.86 Rates of drug and alcohol dependency are similarly high in the homeless 
community. This situation, combined with often unsupported mental health conditions, has been 
found to lead to frequent accessing of emergency services.87 
 Along with mental health conditions and substance use disorders, many three-quarter 
house tenants struggle with ongoing general health problems. This statistic, of course, falls in 
line with the wide body of knowledge that states that socioeconomic status has much to do with 
disparities in public health. Doctors Stephen Isaacs and Steven Schroeder explain, “The poorer a 
person is, the more likely it is that he or she will have to struggle to meet the basic necessities of 
life (such as obtaining food, shelter, and medicine, when necessary), to live in a dangerous 
neighborhood, and to endure the hardships of everyday living.”88 Many academics even believe 
that income is the single most powerful predictor of mortality.89 In the case of individuals living 
in three-quarter houses, almost all of the respondents interviewed for the PRI publication 
reported receiving Medicaid and food stamps, and over ninety percent reported being 
unemployed, further underscoring how economically disadvantaged three quarter tenants tend to 
be. Residents described inoperable kitchens or no kitchens at all, forcing them to eat out and buy 
the cheapest and often least healthy option available—McDonald’s, Burger King, and other fast 
food restaurants being a common choice for many.90 In sum, limited access to jobs and income 
can cause major obstacles to health-promoting goods and services, and cause major 




Figure 1. Background on three-quarter house tenants92 
 
Individuals come to live at three-quarter houses through a variety of ways. To prospective 
tenants, operators promote their houses as “programs,” often calling them “sober homes” or 
“transitional houses” and giving them names like “Back on Track”93 or “Freedom Houses.”94 
The majority of tenants described finding their three-quarter house through a drug or alcohol 
treatment program. Other tenants hear about three-quarter houses through people they know; 
some are recruited by operators at prisons, jails, soup kitchens, or other service providers, and 
some are referred there directly by the New York City Department of Homeless Services (DHS) 
and by parole.95  As the PRI report aptly describes, “Three-quarter houses now serve alongside 
the shelter system as an informal, unregulated arm of the city’s apparatus for housing its 
homeless population.”96 As existing housing options for low income people have steadily 
decreased—such as Section 8 subsidies awarded by DHS—city and state agencies have 
scrambled to find other alternatives. The PRI report states that, “While placements of homeless 
adults into subsidized housing dropped by 64 percent from 2004 to 2007, placements in 




three-quarter houses, rose by 93 percent during that same period.”97 Homeless advocates 
denounce DHS referrals as a convenient way that the city can claim lower homeless numbers in 
the shelter system, as three-quarter house tenants are not considered homeless once placed.98 
Figure 2. Referrals to three-quarter houses99 
  
The three-quarter house private, for-profit business model operates almost entirely 
through fees paid for by public funds. Houses are generally leased out to be operated by a single 
person, a nonprofit, or a limited liability corporation.100 House operators often manage more than 
one house—in one case an operator was found to operate eighteen houses at a given time.101 
Rents vary depending on a tenant’s particular circumstances: some may receive the public 
assistance shelter allowance of $215 per month; others may receive Social Security Disability 
(SSD), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), unemployment insurance benefits; still others may 
be employed and pay out-of-pocket. Those who do not receive the shelter allowance are often 
charged more than the $215 assessed to public assistance recipients.102 The total amount of 
public funds paid out to three-quarter house operators is unknown. However, in 2014 alone, the 
HRA paid one well-known operator amongst three-quarter house tenants—who has been sued on 




 Much more alarming than the revenue produced from rent payments to three-quarter 
house operators, is the alleged money-making relationships that operators keep with particular 
treatment programs that are licensed by the state agency, the Office of Alcohol and Substance 
Abuse Services (OASAS).104 As the PRI explains, “Evidence suggests that these programs may 
be paying houses kickbacks for referrals of clients. Many houses mandate that tenants attend the 
program with which they have an arrangement and then hand in proof of attendance after every 
single treatment session. Tenants offer accounts of being evicted without court process or 
threatened with eviction if they fail to prove they attended program…”105  Drug and alcohol 
treatment is covered by Medicaid, which many three-quarter house tenants receive.  
 While operators allegedly make high profits from tax payer dollars, tenants are faced with 
precarious housing conditions. Dangerous physical conditions of buildings pose a hazard to 
tenants and surrounding communities, though most go unnoticed due to a lack of regulation and 
enforcement of building codes. Along with alarming levels of overcrowding, windows and 
means of egress are frequently blocked, making houses potential firetraps.106 Houses are often 
unsanitary, as operators rarely attend to routine maintenance. Minor leaks become major 
plumbing issues and common sightings of vermin become infestations throughout the building. 
Tenants expressed fear of retaliation for reporting problems to the city, and when they do report, 
house operators often prevent inspectors from gaining access to buildings.107 
 Along with hazardous living conditions, tenants described rampant violations of their 
rights and persistent obstructions to recovery and reintegration.108 With no government 
oversight, house operators can do business as they please, and can maximize profits in whatever 
way possible: “Tenants report problematic activities ranging from illegal evictions, extensive 




appropriation of public assistance and Medicaid funds.”109 Under New York City and New York 
State law, tenants who have resided in a dwelling for thirty days or more cannot be evicted 
without court process.110 Despite this statute, operators rely on the practice or threat of illegal 
eviction to maximize profits and control tenants, pushing one tenant out only to immediately 
refill the bed with somebody else. Tenants are commonly evicted for advocating on their own 
behalf (such as asking for heat in the winter months), breaking “house rules,” or completing their 
house-mandated treatment program. Many times these self-help evictions take place with no 
prior notice, in the early morning hours, and during the harsh winter months.111 When tenants are 
illegally put out and neglect to stop rent payments, operators may continue collecting rent from 
them months later. Of all of the unjust treatment that the tenants face, illegal eviction is said to be 
one of the most egregious acts against people living in three-quarter houses 
 Illegal evictions can have devastating effects on residents’ lives. Tenants who are put out 
from one day to the next face many avoidable risks and dangers: parolees who lose their place of 
residence can be sent back to jail or others, who struggle with chemical dependency, may 
relapse. The fear of losing one’s home is so strong, PRI reports, that tenants feel “a perverse 
incentive . . .  to make themselves continually eligible for treatment in order to avoid being 
evicted, whether by exaggerating or fabricating substance abuse histories, or even relapsing.”112 
One tenant even disclosed going through four programs in a span of two and half years, simply 
to keep the bed at his three-quarter house.113 As tenants live in a state of uncertainty, unable to 
predict what their lives will look like from one day to the next, they often do whatever possible 
to keep one thing stable: their housing. 
 A New York Times exposé in May 2015 spotlights one particularly bad landlord named 




needed it or were satisfied with the services they were receiving. Along with mandating 
treatment, he verbally abused tenants, threatened them with illegal eviction, kicked people out in 
the dead of winter, and even pocketed some of the tenants’ disability checks.  
 In one particularly obscene turn of events, Baumblit, who had leased 12 apartment 
buildings from one owner in Brooklyn, had stopped paying the rent but had continued payment 
collections from tenants. When Baumblit was evicted from the houses for failure to pay rent to 
the building owner, he agreed to vacate the premises and committed to help relocate the tenants 
in the 12 houses to other three-quarter houses. Kim Barker, author of the New York Times 
exposé, writes:  
 
 But none of the residents were told. Eviction notices were thrown away, and Mr.   
 Baumblit kept moving in new tenants. On Dec. 17, the city marshals showed up. They  
 locked up six of the 12 apartments, giving the few residents who were not at group114 15  
 minutes to grab what they could. On the streets, tenants huddled, wondering whether this  
 was really happening. The week before Christmas, 60 people were suddenly homeless.115  
 
While an extreme case of abusive practices, the example of Yury Baumblit highlights the lack of 
protections and supports in place for three-quarter house tenants and the lack of enforcement 
measures to stop operators from taking advantage of vulnerable individuals.  
 Three-quarter houses label themselves as “programs” and promise various supports to 
potential clients, but many houses actually hinder tenants’ efforts to maintain sobriety or 
transition after being incarcerated.116  And yet, despite serious problems and risks, tenants 
describe this housing stock as a critical option for people who do not want to live in a homeless 
shelter or on the street. Unlike homeless shelters, three-quarter houses offer “a degree of 
independence, striking a balance between freedom and structure, and enabling supportive 




exist, these characteristics are important points to remember when considering the three-quarter 
house industry.  
 Though three-quarter houses are invisible to many, the housing crisis in New York City 
is not. Press coverage has brought three-quarter houses to light in a new way, but much more 
must be done to diagnose just how large the illicit housing industry is, whom exactly it serves, 
and why it is necessary. As one former tenant describes it, people will continue cycling between 
homelessness, chemical dependency, three-quarter houses, and prison as long as the system 
exists and as long as things stay as they are today.118  
 
RESIST OR REFORM 
 
”As we live in the wealthiest country in the world, we have a moral obligation to ensure that 
people are not made vulnerable as a consequence of the profitability of the housing market. 
Homeless people have been at the receiving end of broken policies and economic dogmas that 
have dictated the fundamental aspects of their lives, and they have had no agency in sculpting 
them.”  
—William S. Burnett, a housing campaign leader and board member at Picture the Homeless, is 
homeless.119 
  
 Reforms to tackle inequality in New York City have not gone far enough. These attempts 
have attacked symptoms of problems and have left their roots to give birth to the same issue in a 
new context. Housing policies confronted illegal tenements, only for three-quarter houses to be 




control. “This method,” Friedrich Engles argues, “is called ‘Haussman’120… No matter how 
different the reasons may be, the result is always the same; the scandalous alleys and lanes 
disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise from the bourgeoisie on account of this 
tremendous success, but they appear again immediately somewhere else . . . The same economic 
necessity which produced them in the first place, produces them in the next place.121 Keeping 
this in mind, we examine responses to the housing crisis and discuss what is actually necessary if 
we hope to provide dignified living environments for all of our communities. 
 New York City — “a gated community for the rich” — has become a more and more 
difficult place to live for many people. Amongst those that struggle the most are those that are 
homeless. In October of 2014, 64,000 people resided at homeless shelters throughout the city—
the largest number ever recorded.122 That number has since decreased, but the problem persists. 
The city reports homelessness based on individuals living in the New York City shelter system. 
Along with three-quarter houses, there are many other forms of precarious housing that the city 
neglects to count. This includes domestic violence shelters, LGBTQ shelters, unaccompanied 
minor shelters, the street homeless count, illegal SROs, and the many individuals that are living 
on friends’ or families’ couches because they have nowhere else to go. While there is no 
calculation of what the numbers amount to, one can only imagine how astounding the figure 
actually is. 
 As if record-breaking homelessness were not enough, the complex, the three-quarter 
house industry adds another thorn to the housing crisis that each Mayor of New York City has 
promised to confront. In May 2014, Mayor de Blasio unveiled his new housing plan: 80,000 new 
low-cost homes and 120,000 homes preserved. He proclaimed, “This plan will create opportunity 




the midst of what has been the greatest affordability crisis this city has ever experienced.”123 His 
affordable housing plans rely on a tool called inclusionary zoning, in which private developers 
can incorporate some percentage of below-market-rate units into their new developments so that 
they may be rented or at least targeted towards households within specific income brackets.124  
 De Blasio’s rezoning plan would require builders to set aside 25 percent of units for 
families meeting a certain area median income. One of the critiques of inclusionary zoning, 
Professor Samuel Stein writes, is that “the “affordable housing” that is available is not affordable 
to most New Yorkers.125 As with a lot of other programs, inclusionary rents are based on Area 
Median Incomes (AMI) — the federal government’s calculation based on incomes, rents, and 
construction cots in the city and its wealthier suburbs.” Between 25% and 30% of new 
apartments would be set aside for tenants earning between $47,000 and $93,000 a year 
(calculated for a family of three).126 Along with this limitation, inclusionary zoning is said to 
produce too few units to even keep up with population growth, and that it radically transforms 
neighborhoods and displaces entire communities that cannot keep up with rising costs of 
living.127  
 According to Stein, the mayor is walking closely behind his predecessor Michael 
Bloomberg, who used the same tools to promote his affordable housing plan. “By 
wholeheartedly embracing inclusionary zoning,” he writes, “the new mayor gets to put forth a 
big, bold plan for reducing inequalities without fundamentally challenging the dynamics between 
developers and communities, landlords and tenants, or housing and the market.”128 Like previous 
attempts, mandatory inclusionary zoning will fail to reach communities that need housing the 




 The scope of the housing crisis is hard to grasp. However, solutions are not. Stein writes, 
“Politicians and policymakers treat housing like a puzzle to be solved with the right balance of 
subsidies and profits. But affordable housing isn’t a mystery, it’s a contradiction: it can’t be done 
in a way that benefits both capital and workers in equal measure.”129 Understanding that local 
government interests are so deeply aligned with the global neoliberal doctrine, we should not 
expect radically different policies to be proposed anytime soon. If policy makers and advocates 
hope to help combat systems of inequality, then they must do so through two approaches: 1) 
alleviating the immediate needs of community members and 2) helping to organize those that are 
most directly affected by the systems of oppression. Only then will they help build the type of 
city that so many desperately want and need. 
 Meeting the immediate needs of community members is an important tool to achieve 
long-term change. The Sylvia Rivera Law Project describes this as service, which “encompasses 
work that directly serves oppressed people and helps stabilize their lives and promote their 
survival.”130 Individuals who have stability in their lives and their basic needs met, are more able 
to engage politically and work to make systemic change for themselves and their communities. 
In the context of the three-quarter house industry, helping a person keep a roof over his/her head, 
find a good doctor, or appeal a denial for public benefits, may grant that person opportunities to 
think of not just the symptoms of a problem, but where the roots of the three-quarter house 
industry lie. Similarly, passing legislation to reform or regulate the three-quarter house system 
may help provide stability to tenants, so that they may have space to make change in other ways.  
 Though providing crucial services to people makes an immediate difference, services will 
not transform the underclass that is made up of poor people of color, which three-quarter house 




quarter house problem, but as a tool to change the system that created the three-quarter house 
industry to begin with. Using this tool and others, advocates must work to organize the 
community. In 1970, Professor Stephen Wexler, discussed this solution in his famous call to 
action, “Practicing Law for Poor People.” In it, he writes: 
 
Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor. If poverty is stopped, it will be 
stopped by poor people. And poor people can stop poverty only if they work at it 
together. The lawyer who wants to serve poor people must put his skills to the task of 
helping poor people organize themselves…The proper job for a poor people’s lawyer is 
helping poor people organize themselves to change things so that either no one is poor or 
(less radically) so that poverty does not entail misery…The lawyer must seek to 
strengthen existing organizations of poor people, and to help poor people start 
organizations where none exist.131 
 
Until now, any strides that our society has made to curb inequality have only been made possible 
through demands by communities who were most affected. People’s common visions for change 
and common experiences have the potential to lift individuals out of isolation and into unified 
groups that have the power to reshape environments. This idea, first proposed by sociologist and 
philosopher Henri Lefebrve, is famously known as the “Right to the City.” David Harvey defines 
the Right to the City as such: 
 
The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind of 
social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we desire. 
The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is 
a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an 
individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a 
collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and 
remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most 





 Right to the City movements have a history as long as cities themselves. That demand 
and cry for help from communities—as Harvey puts it—has always held the potential to create 
something radically different. It is with this in mind that three-quarter house tenants have been 
organizing. The Three-Quarter House Tenant Organizing Project (TOP) is a tenants’ union made 
up of former and current three-quarter house tenants. The union works to improve housing 
conditions, to put an end to illegal treatment of tenants, and to achieve social justice for people 
living in houses and the communities in which they live.133 TOP is a Right to the City 
movement. 
 Strides continue to be made in the direction of progress. While more work needs to be 
done to organize communities, work must also focus on connecting social movements. At the 
heart of all progressive social movements, is a struggle against the same machine that oppresses 
certain communities and privileges others: neoliberalism. In New York City, more and more 
often we see coalitions forming between community-based organizations, unions, and advocacy 
groups. Labor scholar Janice Fine, writes “For a growing number of community organizations 
and unions scattered across the country, the line separating “community issues” from “labor 
issues” is breaking down—just as it always has in the lives of poor and working-class 
families.”134 These coalitions signal change from traditional, single-issue approaches that have 
driven organizations in the past. 
 The Homes for Every New Yorker coalition is working to find solutions to mass 
homelessness in New York City. The coalition has brought together groups that typically fight 
for distinct causes: housing, the economy, access to health care, immigrant rights, LGBTQ 
rights, and an end to mass incarceration and the War on Drugs. Together, they have launched a 




on homelessness. They are pushing the Mayor to adopt a proposal that ensures his affordable 
housing plan allocate at least 10% of all new housing units to homeless families and individuals. 
It also calls on the Mayor to allocate at least 2,500 NYCHA public housing apartments each year 
to homeless families and individuals. In addition to their housing related policy agenda, they 
have called on the state to raise the minimum wage in New York City to $15 and that any new 
city-led developments be partnered with organized labor and the building trades to construct and 
operate buildings. In a report released in April 2015, the coalition presented these and other 
strategies detailing how the city and state can eradicate homelessness by 2020.135 The coalition is 
not just targeting the housing crisis, but instead is aiming to confront systemic inequality as a 
whole, by bringing district groups to the table and by fighting for diverse, yet related causes.  
 Some of the same community-based organizations and unions that are involved in the 
Homes for Every New Yorker Coalition are also involved in the Fight for 15: a labor protest 
movement that began nearly three years ago and spread across the country. In July of 2015, the 
group celebrated a major win, when a panel appointed by Governor Andrew Cuomo 
recommended that the minimum wage be raised to $15 for employees of fast-food chain 
restaurants throughout the state. James R. Knickman, President of the New York State Health 
Foundation and friend to the Fight for 15, hailed the recommendation as the most important 
public health advancement of 2015.136 Without the labor-community partnership, representing an 
array of issues, this victory would not have been celebrated.  
 David Harvey argues that when groups come together to reshape the city, their success 
will rely on a simple principle: whether or not they demand greater democratic control over the 
production and use of surplus value. Surplus value is no longer created through the traditional 




isolated to the workplace. The factory has changed, Harvey writes, and “surplus value is now 
accumulated in the physical representations of the city.”137 As communities organize and 
movements unite, methods of social change must keep this in mind. It can be done: the less 
privileged can reshape the city, by setting a new acceptable standard of living—one that does not 
require people to sleep in crowded rooms or in poor neighborhoods. As community organizer 
Saul Alinsky said, the job then, for advocates, is to get “the people to move, to act, to participate; 
in short, to develop and harness the necessary power to effectively conflict with the prevailing 




 The New York City housing crisis affects those of many different incomes, but its effects 
have been most deeply felt by minority groups and by low-income New Yorkers. Though it is 
complex and relates to many other societal problems, a deepening crisis is entirely avoidable and 
the current crisis can be fixed. What stands between where we are now and where we could be, 
lies in the hands of policy makers, advocates, and most importantly in the communities affected. 
 The roots of the three-quarter house industry and the broader housing crisis have grown 
stronger in the era of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism was not always the dominant doctrine that 
governed in New York City or around the world. In fact, it has only been within the last fifty 
years that neoliberalism has very strategically become what it is today. Thanks to certain 
economic and social conditions, and our deep, cultural ties to liberalism, powerful interests 
succeeded at diluting or reversing systems of support that had previously created a vibrant 




now controls much of the wealth in the United States (and world), while so many others are left 
to live in situations like three-quarter houses. Communities of color have felt the effects of 
neoliberalism in an especially harsh way—becoming the targets of quality-of-life campaigns, 
discriminatory policing and public housing policies, mass incarceration & the failed War on 
Drugs. 
 The rise of the three-quarter house industry has only been made possible through 
neoliberalism. Under this framework, housing has moved from being considered a basic need, to 
becoming a free-market commodity like any other. Coupled with this, a decrease in supportive 
services for people with mental health conditions, substance use disorders, and policies that 
unfairly target and criminalize poor communities of color, has led to a skyrocketing, permanent 
class of homeless New Yorkers. The need for any type of shelter far outweighs what is actually 
available and within reach for people. Exploiting this dramatic need, the three-quarter house 
industry has exploded and hundreds of houses exist throughout the city.  
 Three-quarter house tenants suffer from a combination of struggles. In addition to being 
lucrative targets for unscrupulous landlords, tenants often struggle with drug and alcohol 
dependency, mental health conditions, other medical conditions, unemployment, and severe 
poverty. In addition, they are left to navigate a confusing system of government agencies and 
community resources on their own. Chances of finding the support they need are slim. While 
dealing with these already difficult circumstances, people may face further destabilizing crises 
like illegal evictions, arrest and incarceration, interruptions to public benefits, and medical or 
family emergencies.  In short, tenants are victimized by a multitude of unfortunate 




 Time and again, we see reformist attempts fall short of confronting the root causes of 
social crises in the United States. Therapeutic attempts to help symptoms of problems, while 
simultaneously encouraging de-regulation and free-market approaches, have left us with what we 
have today. Mayor de Blasio’s proposals to curb the housing crisis are inadequate and will likely 
lead to a deeper housing crisis years down the road, unless something changes. It is not said 
lightly; however, in order to stop the housing crisis, nothing short of a halting of neoliberal 
momentum, an undoing of generations of neoliberal policies, and a dramatic shift in 
consciousness will work. Communities must organize, band together across diverse platforms, 
and must demand the changes they wish to see.  
 The goal of this paper was to broadly examine the historical circumstances that gave rise 
to the three-quarter house industry, to examine the industry itself, and to examine the major 
shortcomings of current government attempts to confront the greatest housing crisis New York 
City has ever seen. While it may have succeeded at briefly exploring these topics, it has only 
scraped the surface of a multitude of issues, such as housing, criminal justice, and economic 
inequality. The specific three-quarter house issue is largely unaccounted for in academic research 
and requires much more attention if we hope to understand the intricacies of the industry and 
needs of the affected community. In particular, more research must be done to hear from tenants, 
understand their diverse experiences in three-quarter housing, and to help elevate their identified 
needs.   
 Similarly, the contemporary focus of this paper examines policies under Mayor de Blasio. 
To better understand where the three-quarter house system exists today within the housing crisis, 
the state and federal levels deserve more scrutiny, both through a policy lens and through a 




neoliberal agenda as much as their conservative counterparts. For individuals who are working to 
change the current landscape, shortfalls of progressive politics should be made clear, both to 
empower our communities and to understand what kind of tools such levels of government can 
actually provide to social movements. 
Recalling Lewis Mumford’s writings in “What is the City,” he argues that to best 
promote human potential, the social needs of a community must come before markets and 
industries. Today, powerful leaders and business interests have embraced a system that 
prioritizes profit over people. As this occurs, not only do certain individuals suffer enormous 
costs, but the wider society does, as well. This reality is well exemplified in the case of the three-
quarter house system, where social and economic costs to the individual and on society are 
harrowing. Rather than continue to let the voices of a few prioritize the “needs” of our society 
and thus define the potential of our city, we must work collectively to ensure that the social 
needs of the city are justly defined, and that entrepreneurial freedoms are subservient to those 
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